where G is a well-behaved transformation function. 6 The subscripts on Q denote the industrial (I), residential (R), commercial (C) and wholesale (W) customer classes, respectively; the subscripts on X denote the utilities' major inputs, labor (L), fuel (F), capital (K) and purchased power (Z). Producers purchase their inputs in competitive factor markets and sell kilowatt-hours to a competitive wholesale market and in imperfectly competitive industrial, residential and commercial markets.7 Each utility is a price taker in the wholesale market and in all input markets; in its remaining product markets, it faces a downward sloping demand curve, Pm = hm(Qm,Y), with dhm/OQm <O, m = I,R,C
where Pm is the price of Qm, hm is the aggregate demand for product rn and Y is a vector of variables including consumers' income and the prices of other goods. 8 The price elasticity of demand for output m is r7. In this model, production for each consumer class equals consumption by that class. The industry's inability to store electricity implies producers plan for zero inventories.
A purely profit-maximizing firm would maximize profits, 
Equations (4) are standard: a profit-maximizing firm will choose the output mix at which the marginal rate of transformation between two outputs equals the relative marginal revenues, and each input such that its marginal revenue product equals its price.
Regulatory Policy
Equations (4) characterize the input and output choices of an unregulated profit-maximizing firm. Utilities, however, are regulated: the problem of characterizing this regulation is addressed here. 6 . Diewert [11] presents a discussion of the properties of transformation functions. 7. Joskow and Schmalensee [27, show that interconnected electric utilities operate most efficiently when the loss-adjusted marginal cost of each operating generating plant is the same. The low cost of transmitting electricity over long distances and the national network of interconnecting transmission facilities give a competitive character to the wholesale market.
8. Existing studies of the demand for electricity generally require the researcher to control for the shift variables Y. The model presented in this paper makes estimation of the demand elasticities possible without attempting to obtain actual or proxy measures of Y. Taylor [41] surveys a number of studies and discusses elements of Y used there; some rather complicated specifications also appear in Meyer and Leland [30] 
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"Regulation" of the electric utilities is frequently modeled as a "rate of return" constraint imposed on the profit maximizing firm. This form of regulation leads to the "AverchJohnson effect" [2] : an over-intensive use of capital relative to the cost-minimizing input mix for the same output mix. The Averch-Johnson view of regulation has been criticized elsewhere. The most damaging criticism of the Averch-Johnson model is that it is too static. A firm's input mix at any time actually depends on past realizations and future expectations of regulatory policy.'? The Averch-Johnson distortion arises if investments are perfectly reversible or if a regulated firm makes a positive investment in every period of its life and the firm never incurs a loss.
In an alternative view of regulation, the regulators are concerned primarily with price levels and relative prices, and secondarily with rates of return." The "rate of return constraint" is satisfied through the choice of prices by regulators. This type of regulation implies the use of "inverse elasticity" or "Ramsey optimal" pricing as formalized by Baumol where X is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the minimum profit constraint the regulator must satisfy. The "Ramsey number" associated with this form of regulation is (X-1)/ X. Since the profit constraint is empirically unknown, there are no data on the Ramsey number: the multiplier X cannot be identified as an estimable parameter.
Ross [39, 152 ] modifies inverse-elasticity pricing: "regulators choose prices to maximize some weighted sum of consumers' and producer's surpluses". He presents a technique for obtaining the regulators' weights given data on price, marginal costs, and demand elasticities. One approach that Ross uses is to weight the implied social welfare function by the share of each consumer class in the consumption of a good. 13 12. There are a number of different specifications for this rule. Expression (5) and subsequent discussion follow Ross [39] .
13. The share weighting approach is similar to a weighting approach used by Feldstein [15] to solve an optimal taxation problem. Nelson [34] proposes that consumers whose share of electricity consumption is large receive price concessions from regulators. can be identified in the estimating model, their ratio is identifiable. The weight regulators attach to deviations from marginal cost pricing is thus given for each consumer class by 1 -Km Sm.
Another possible regulatory policy is marginal cost pricing. In this event, we would observe marginal rates of transformation equal to relative product prices, while the value of the marginal product of each input would equal its price.
Econometric Model
An econometric model must be derived from the multiple-output optimization problem.14 First, the production correspondence (1) 
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Stephen H. Karlson demand elasticities, technology coefficients and regulatory effect variables are estimable parameters.
Hypotheses
There are two groups of hypotheses which will be tested in this research. The first is a test of the appropriateness of the multiple-output specification of the structure of production. A sufficient test for multiple-output production is the rejection of the hypothesis of separability'7 of inputs and outputs, which would allow (1) to be rewritten as Ql = G(f(QR, Qc, Q ), g(XL,XK,XF,XZ)). Under this null hypothesis, the regulators require the price of each kind of electricity to equal its marginal cost.'9 17. The model imposes some separability in that an implicit transformation frontier is solved for one output. Such a solution can be postulated whenever the transformation frontier is well-behaved; the solution does not sacrifice any marginal rates of substitution or transformation, but it reduces the number of free parameters in the model.
18. Although separability of inputs and outputs implies aggregation of output is possible, it does not imply that the marginal costs of all types of electricity are the same. Another step is required: is the marginal rate of transformation between any two outputs in the aggregate always unity? If so, a single-output production function could be used to model the production of electricity. If the marginal rate of transformation depends on input levels, it cannot be unity everywhere: rejection of separability is sufficient evidence of multiple-output production.
19. If regulators impose marginal cost pricing on utilities, it does not follow that consumer demands for electricity are infinitely elastic. Rather, the utility must provide whatever electricity consumers demand at those prices; it will do so most efficiently if it selects inputs and outputs on the basis of those relative product and input prices.
III. Estimation and Test Results

Data
The econometric model is estimated on a sample of 28 privately-owned electric utilities which rely primarily on coal-fired generation. The sample is restricted to firms which have adopted a similar technology and exist in substantially similar market and regulatory environments.20 Engineering considerations and econometric research strongly suggest that generation technologies differ among fuel types.21 Coal-fired utilities have accounted for an increasing share of U.S. electricity production; in 1978, 44 percent of U.S. electricity was so produced [42, ii] .
Firms which are either publicly owned or earn more than one-third of their revenue from the distribution of natural gas22 are excluded from the data set. Publicly owned utilities face different regulatory constraints; their managements may have different objectives from those of investor-owned utilities. Combination utilities are likely to share managers, billing services, maintenance and some physical plant between their electric and gas divisions.
Utilities Revenues for sales to residential, industrial and commercial customers, as well as quantities sold to these consumer classes, are reported in [43]. Physical sales for resale, and resale revenues, are not those reported in [43] for firms with negative net interchanges.24 In this paper, power which is interchanged out to other utilities is treated as a sale for resale. Hence, "sales for resale" is defined as the sum of reported sales for resale and the absolute value of negative net interchanges. The imputed revenue from sales for resale is computed such that the difference between revenue from sales for resale and purchased power expenses used in the data set is equal to the difference between those entries reported in [43] .
Since the translog transformation frontier is an approximation based on a Taylor expansion around zero, all input and output data are scaled to their means.
Estimates
The parameter estimates obtained by the multivariate regression system (expressions (8) and (10)) are reported in Table I . The estimates satisfy the efficiency conditions (symmetry, power, but sometimes to permit a generator to be taken out of service for maintenance. Interchanges differ from sales for resale, which arise when a utility with generating capacity sells power to another utility, generally a distribution utility with no generating capacity of its own. While [43] reports separate entries for quantities sold for resale or interchanged, one account, "purchased power expenses", contains both expenditures on purchased power (a positive number), and the balance resulting when utilities settle accounts for interchanges (which may be positive or negative for any firm). Table I Second, the estimated long-run demand elasticities are larger than most prior estimates28 for residential and industrial demands, but smaller for commercial customers.29 Consequently, the implicit profit-maximizing price associated with any marginal cost would be lower for residential and industrial users, and higher for commercial consumers, if these elasticities were used in preference to Mount, Chapman and Tyrrell [32] elasticities. Both Meyer and Leland [30] and Nelson [34] observed changes in relative regulated prices in favor of residential consumers. They attribute this change to regulatory policy; the results here would be equally due to rational pricing by utilities.
Regulated Pricing The parameters reported in
Third, the hypothesis that regulation does not have an effect on pricing has been articulated previously. Stigler and Friedland [40] suggest that the ineffectiveness of regulation (of electric utility rates prior to 1937) can be due to one of two things: the monopoly power of the utility is slight; or the regulator is incapable of monitoring every decision of the firm. Posner [36, 34] Consider, however that wholesale power is priced at its marginal cost. Furthermore, these multiproduct electric utilities operate under conditions of decreasing ray average cost.31 Baumol [3] demonstrates complete marginal cost pricing cannot cover all the costs of a firm operating under those cost conditions. The marginal cost pricing hypothesis is convincingly rejected: the X2 statistic for this test is 999.90; the 99% critical value with six degrees of freedom is 16.81. Given decreasing ray average cost, and given that wholesale power is priced at marginal cost, prices which cover the costs of the multiple product electric utility could be indistinguishable from prices chosen according to the monopoly pricediscrimination rule. 32 Furthermore, some previous published research finds evidence of utility behavior not inconsisteit with the profit-maximizing hypothesis. Implicitly, the Averch-Johnson model of regulation carries with it the hypothesis of monopoly profit-maximizing behavior. Boyes [6, 28] 
IV. Conclusions
The multiple output model of production and consumption yields a number of implications. First, the multiple output specification is appropriate: electric utilities produce distinct products for markets with distinct demand characteristics. The research shows that different consumer classes have different elasticities of demand for electricity. The prices which consumers face are not different from those which would be chosen by a profit-maximizing monopolist. Given the evidence of decreasing ray average costs in this sample, however, such discriminatory prices may be necessary to cover the costs of the firms. Marginal cost Each consumer class buys a unique product, each output has a different marginal cost; each marginal cost depends on the mix of inputs and outputs in each firm. Hence researchers seeking evidence of price discrimination, cross-subsidization, or Ramsey pricing in electricity rates may create specification bias in their models by imposing separability. The regulatory policy implications drawn from the iurestricted model of production are very different from those obtained when separability is imposed.
The research also illustrates the sensitivity of findings to the specification of models and the choice of data sets.
Does the presence of natural monopoly in electricity production suggest that deregulation cannot be applied to electric utilities to the extent it has been applied in transportation? Joskow and Schmalensee [27] endorse this position: of four possible deregulatory scenarios they consider, three envision continued regulation of at least the distribution and transmission networks, which are viewed as the source of the natural monopoly.
Their fourth scenario is complete deregulation of electric utilities. They rule out this policy [27, 154], arguing that deregulated firms would, in the short run, raise their prices further and engage in price discrimination to maximize their profits. The evidence in this paper suggests that these 28 regulated utilities were doing exactly that in 1978. Under complete deregulation, these consumers would be no worse off. There is in fact a possibility that consumer welfare could be improved under deregulation. All prices33 are at least as high as marginal costs in this sample. Production is at least cost, and ray average costs are declining. These conditions are among those necessary for the "sustainability" of a natural monopoly against entry. If the necessary conditions34 are satisfied, a deregulated natural monopoly can choose a set of output prices which will deter entry. Baumol, Bailey and Willig [4] show that, if there are prices sustainable against entry, those sustainable prices include Ramsey-optimal prices, i.e., prices that maximize social welfare yet cover all the costs of the regulated firm. Under deregulation, we would expect incumbent utilities to charge entry-deterring prices. If current regulated prices are higher than such prices, complete deregulation of electricity production could make consumers better off. 33 . This model uses average prices of electricity; a generalization would control for the "block" structure of electricity prices. Primeaux and Nelson [38] find "internal subsidization" in block pricing structures: the price of the last block of electricity is less than its marginal cost. They do not compute the stand-alone costs of power to each consumer group.
34. The necessary conditions are presented in Panzar and Willig [35] .
